ABSTRACT.     Politicians, journalists - commentators on economic matters generally - evolve a sort of quasi-stable rhetoric. They select two or three foreign countries with which they like to compare their own, either as models to be followed, or traps to be avoided. Other countries are rarely or never mentioned. They repeat over and over again mantras such as "we are the fourth largest economy in the world" in the UK, or variants of "the dot.com revolution" or "the new paradigm" in the USA. In arguments in the UK over the replacement of sterling by the Euro, it is almost a daily occurrence to hear growth in the UK contrasted with recession in Eurozone Germany. It appears likely that these stories emerge in part from appraisals of GDP expressed for the purpose of cross-country comparison in a currency unit (the Euro or dollar, say) calculated at the ruling rate of exchange. This calculation can be done instantly. It is "news". The more recent method of using purchasing power is much more complex and its results are published late. They are not "news", and do not affect the established rhetoric. Nevertheless, they are the truth, or as near to that as economic data can be, and often quite strikingly at variance with the current story.
Is the UK the fourth largest economy in the world as both government and opposition politicians of that country are fond of saying, the former as a boast, the latter as a preamble to complaining about the state of the hospitals, railways, etc? Is the USA motoring ahead, widening the gap with the rest of the world? Is Italy lingering behind the leading EU nations? Would it be a grave mistake, as UK newspapers and politicians are stating at present, for the UK to adopt the Euro currency when the UK is at present growing while the Eurozone is stagnating? At any given time, the world view is being shaped by a sort of chorus, in which vague but persistent and near-universal positions are, not argued or demonstrated, but merely propagated by the endless repetition of and re-echoing of standard phrases. Presumably these phrases originated in forgotten sources of factual data, but only “facts” which fit the required rhetoric are preserved, repeated and amplified. They are usually not retailed as the central story, but as received background, to be worked in as throwaway phrases.
The origin of these notions cannot be certain, but it seems from their nature that those relating to economics rely heavily on GDP statistics obtained from tables which present cross-country data in units of a standard currency, say the US dollar or the Euro, the conversions being done at ruling currency exchange rates. Such statistics inevitably reflect the volatility of the currency market, so much so that it is rather odd that official bodies continue to publish such numbers. On this basis the fourth largest economy of the world could easily become the sixth largest almost overnight, while nothing changes that any citizen of that country would notice.
The attraction of GDP expressed in a standard currency, presumably, is that the underlying calculation is “transparent”. The calculation of GDP for each country is in itself highly un-transparent, but the hugely expensive procedures needed can be afforded only by the state, so there is not much room for argument. Merely to tabulate more or less unquestioned national GDP data, converted into a foreign currency using the uncontroversial, published, and immediately available, market exchange rate is an easy, cheap, quick, and trouble-free option.
The use of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), i.e., the use of a unit related to purchasing power rather than to supply and demand in the currency markets, has achieved prominence only relatively recently. To an outsider, the immense difficulties can only be imagined. First, the data involved are available only within the statistical offices of each country, and second, it is by no means clear what “basket” of goods should figure in the cross-country conversion matrix - it might even be argued that a different basket is needed depending on what use is to be made of the result which emerges. The complexities also mean that the results come late (see footnote), a fact which may also imply that it is the quick results which fashion the public myths. The truth rarely catches up.
Be all that as it may, Keynes’ observation applies. It is better to be approximately right than to be precisely wrong, and it is abundantly clear that cross-country comparisons using precise market currency conversion rates are too volatile ever to be right.
A glance at figure 1 illustrates many of the points mentioned above.
Figure 1. GDP per head in Euro (full line) and PPS (dotted line). US-blue. Japan-brown. Italy-red. For both Euro and PPS, EU=100
Even from a simple common-sense view, the three relatively stable dotted lines (PPS) are more plausible than the much more volatile full lines (Euros).
The EU (meaning the 15 countries which now make up the EU) did indeed close the living-standards gap with the US from 1960 to 1980, but at nothing like the rate shown using currency conversion rates. Since 1980, virtually nothing has happened to this gap (according to this PPS data), contrary to the universal cacophony of comment on the new paradigm of US growth (dot-com, high-tech, etc.) from 1995 to 2000 (now more muted of course).
Japan is shown not to have been so poor, and never to have become so rich, as was thought. It has never come near to US levels. On the other hand, the downturn (remembering always that this is measured relative to the EU) from 1996 onwards is shown to be real.
Italy, which in the public discussion of economic progress is for some obscure reason virtually never mentioned in any capacity whatever, is shown to have marched steadily upwards during this 40-year period, is now above the EU average in GDP per head in PPS terms, and is apparently about level with Japan.
What about the other three large EU countries, Germany, the UK, and France? The data are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2. GDP per head in Euro (full line) and PPS (dotted line). France-blue. UK-brown, Germany-red. For both Euro and PPS, EU=100
Again, it is seen that that the curves for GDP per head in Euros, while not so volatile as the US and Japanese ones, are much more so than those based on PPS.
For a not-too-young UK reader, the most noticeable feature of the UK's PPS-based curve, is that nothing much happened, relative to EU levels, between 1974 and 2002, in spite of the enormous hoop-la associated with “the winter of discontent” and the “Thatcher miracle”. The UK just more or less kept up with the rest of the EU throughout. If there was a notable turning point in British economic progress, it would appear to be, not in 1979, when Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister, but in 1974, the beginning of the ill-starred Wilson/Callaghan government, when the decline of the UK relative to the EU apparently halted. In recent years, presumably it is the very rapid nominal rise of the UK’s GDP which has given rise to the myth of the world’s 4th economic power, the nominal rise being due to the strong pound (or the weak Euro). The UK’s real relative living standards have if anything tended to fall somewhat. There is no evidence in this graph that the UK is in real terms doing noticeably better or worse, in recent years, than the Eurozone.
Germany in PPS terms has followed a path of gradual decline, relative to the EU average, over the 40-year period. France too follows a fairly smooth path, in this case one of rise and then fall. At no time in this period has France surpassed Germany in living standards, not even in and after 1991 when the (then West) German level was reduced by amalgamation with the DDR. After 1968, the French level remained very significantly above the UK level until recent years when it fell very near the EU average, where Britain had been, more or less, since 1974.
Showing all the data of figures 1 and 2 on one graph would result in an incomprehensible tangle of lines. In figure 3, the data for GDP per head, in units of PPS only, are amalgamated for all six countries.
Figure 3. GDP per head in PPS. France-green. UK-pink. Germany-red. US-light green. Japan-brown. Italy-blue. EU=100.
It is striking that apart from the US, the five others have in 40 years converged from quite a wide spread, to living standards which are, within 5 percentage points, more or less identical. The US seemed for about 15 of these years to be taking part in this process of convergence, and then stopped - that is, its real growth rate in living standards recovered to about the same as that of the European Union, and has remained so for the last 25 years. Of course, this observation regarding the convergence of the four others depends on the marked slowing of growth rate in Japan in the last 5 or 6 years, and on the sudden fall in the German figures in 1991 due to re-unification.
To eyes used to years of British or Anglo-Saxon commentary, the position regarding Italy is quite remarkable. The usual Anglo-Saxon story is that while serious figures like Macmillan, Willy Brandt, and Greenspan wrestle with varying degrees of success with our economies, Italian leaders come and go with such dizzying speed that they have no time to get to grips with anything. So it is odd to notice that this country, which like re-unified Germany has great regional disparities, has steadily drawn level with the UK around 1980, and with France around 1995, and is by this measure now among the leaders. This being so, the position in the world league table, of “economies” other than the US, depends almost entirely on population, with Japan clearly ranking second, and Germany third.
In figure 4, the data for GDP per head, in units of Euros at current rates of exchange, are amalgamated for all six countries.
Figure 4. GDP per head in Euros. France-green. UK-pink. Germany-red. US-light green. Japan-brown. Italy-blue. EU=100.
No detailed commentary will be given. The greater volatility is evident. The comparative trajectories of the US versus Japan, and Italy versus the UK, are radically different from the relation conveyed by the “real” data in figure 3.
The following tables 1-3 give data for the year 2002, for the 6 “largest economies of the world”, the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK, France and Italy. The three tables all contain exactly the same data, but are ranked according to the value of three different parameters, the GDP in Euro, the GDP in PPS, and the GDP per head in PPS.
Tables 1, 2, 3. Main parameters for 6 leading countries. EU=100 for all parameters.
The populations of the US, Japan and Germany place them by any measure as the three largest economies of the world (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1 shows that GDP, evaluated at current exchange rates, ranks the UK quite distinctly in 4th place. France, and Italy, trailing behind by very clear margins, 9 and 24 percentage points respectively. Presumably it is these figures which have launched "the fourth largest economy of the world" into the standard rhetoric of British comment.
Table 2 gives a totally different and truer impression, based on rankings using GDP in PPS units. Now France is nominally the “4th largest economy in the world” (one wonders, are French politicians aware of this?). Italy is still 6th. But the margins involved are quite insignificant, given that the placing of a number on GDP is in any case an inexact science. If the UK is re-based to UK=100, France is placed at 100.5, Italy at 99.6. In effect, none of these three countries can claim on a realistic basis to be the “4th largest economy in the world”. They are all 4th equal (are Italian politicians aware of this?).
Table 3 ranks the countries by PPS per head, or standard of living. The USA, of course, heads the list again. The spread among the five trailing countries is not great - less than 5 percentage points from top to bottom. Italy does, however, lead those five, along with Germany and Japan. To the author of this note, it speaks volumes about the objectivity and scientific basis of general comment on economic matters, that over the last several decades, there has been endless analysis of the lessons to the world of the Japanese and German economies (as well as that of the US), and the odd mention of the UK and France, but total silence on Italy.
In order to give a fuller picture, including the smaller countries of the European Union, from Spain downwards, a further three figures are given, all in terms of GDP per head in terms of PPS (EU=100).
The first, figure 5, represents six of the richer countries of the EU, apart from the “big four” already presented.
Figure 5. GDP per head in PPS. Denmark-green. Holland-pink. Belgium-red. Austria-light green. Sweden-brown. Luxembourg-blue. EU=100.
The tiny state of Luxembourg (less than half a million people) can be ignored, since totally untypical regions of this size could be found within almost any country of the EU. The remainder show convergence, Denmark and Sweden losing ground relatively, Austria gaining ground to catch up. It is not suggested, of course, that convergence has to do with the EU - Denmark joined in1973, Austria and Sweden in 1995.
Figure 6 shows six “poorer” countries, this term being stretched to include Finland, which was not much poorer than Austria in 1960, and Japan, which began relatively poor in the period covered.
Figure 6. GDP per head in PPS. Spain-green. Portugal-pink. Greece-red. Finland-light green. Japan-brown. Ireland-blue. EU=100.
Ireland is highly anomalous for reasons which are not clear to the author. Although a number of glib explanations are current for its phenomenal growth since 1986, it is by no means clear why they do not apply to other countries or regions. One way in which it shows anomaly is that of all the countries covered, it has by far the largest share of GDP “exported” (net) as the earnings of foreigners. This factor means that although GDP per head in PPS in 2002 is near 120 (EU=100), the standard of living of inhabitants is more like 105. According to these figures, the progress of Ireland and Japan during those 40 years has been similar, although by very, very different trajectories. It can be seen that, leaving Ireland and Japan aside, the other countries have by less spectacular routes gained from 20 to 30 percentage points relative to the EU average in the period covered, with, in the case of Spain Portugal and Greece, as much again still to go.
Figure 7 shows all the data for the 17 countries, limited to GDP per head in PPS, in an attempt to show something like the whole picture.
Figure 7. GDP per head in PPS. 17 countries, US to Luxembourg. EU=100.
It is seen that if we exclude Luxembourg on grounds of its smallness, and the US on grounds of its god-given size, geographical, agricultural and mineral resources, and historical luck, 12 other countries have converged from a spread of 40 or more percentage points to one of half that. The remaining three countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece, have closed the gap between themselves and the richer countries very considerably. Even the US has lost about 20 percentage points of its initial advantage, but has maintained that new relative position for the last 3 decades
Politicians, journalists - commentators on economic matters generally - evolve a sort of quasi-stable rhetoric. They select two or three foreign countries with which they like to compare their own, either as models to be followed, or traps to be avoided. Other countries are rarely or never mentioned. They repeat over and over again mantras such as "we are the fourth largest economy in the world" in the UK, or variants of "the dot.com revolution" or "the new paradigm" in the USA. In arguments in the UK over the replacement of sterling by the Euro, it is almost a daily occurrence to hear growth in the UK contrasted with recession in Eurozone Germany. It appears likely that these stories emerge in part from appraisals of GDP expressed for the purpose of cross-country comparison in a currency unit (the Euro or dollar, say) calculated at the ruling rate of exchange. This can be done instantly. It is "news".
The more recent method of using purchasing power is much more complex and its results are published late (see footnote). They are not "news", and do not affect the established rhetoric. Nevertheless, they are the truth, or as near to that as economic data can be, and often quite strikingly at variance with the current story.
Thus, since 1974, the US has not increased, but simply maintained the gap in living standards between itself and the EU. In the last four years, it has if anything lost ground, but, expressed in neutral terms, it is too early to say that this is a trend. Similarly, the UK, also since 1975, has merely kept pace with the EU average. Germany, like the UK, has declined over the years to around the EU average, but by a different route, and helped on its way very much by the re-unification of 1991. As to current talk of German or Eurozone "recession" (supported, it must be said, by the native German rhetoricians), or, by contrast, talk of UK growth, there is simply no convincing evidence. Gordon Brown gets a very good press for rhetoric, but the figures show no evidence of his presence.
Italy, almost unobserved by the commentators, has shown almost uninterrupted progress. Contrary to British claims, or rather re-iterated and unargued statements, about being "the fourth largest economy in the world", Italy now shares with France and Britain the rank of 4th equal in terms of living standards multiplied by population. Japan, on the other hand, does conform to the general story of its relative decline. It reached a peak of prosperity in 1993, maintained this, relative to the EU, until 1997, but since then has declined (relatively) to a level similar to that of Italy and Germany, around 4 percentage points above the EU average.
A striking feature of the data, when seen as a whole as in figure 7, is that, if the tiny state of Luxembourg is excluded, there is no country which is exempted from the tendency towards convergence, poor countries tending to grow faster than the rich ones.
Footnote (added 9th June 2004):
I quote from the Eurostat Statistics in Focus, KS-NJ-04-027-EN-N, May 2004, "GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards for EU Candidate Countries and EFTA":
“A frequent user complaint was that the PPP results came too late for their purposes and that there were no early estimates available. Until 2003, preliminary PPP results for the reference year T were only available 12 months, and final results 24 months, after the end of the reference year.”
European Economy No 6/2002, The European Commission.
We all, including economics professors, statisticians and journalists, know just by looking around that our comfort and prosperity is determined by the plethora of objects produced by technical innovations over the millennia, centuries and decades. The earnings of billionaire investment managers may come from their “services”, but their prosperity is manifest in their possession of, or ability to buy, things which have been grown, cooked, mined, constructed, or manufactured. However, by some quirk of social psychology, those economics professors, statisticians and journalists (and no doubt bankers too) apparently believe, simultaneously, that things are not “important”. Agriculture has already been written off as “contributing only 2% of the economy”, and manufacturing is “declining” towards the same invisibility. Recently headlines appeared in the Financial Times and the Daily Mail that “business and financial services eclipse manufacturing” and “the City is supreme as factories fade away”. What was the source of those preposterous views? None other that our Office of National Statistics, whose own press release had been headlined in a similar way. As usual there was no response from any quarter, not even from the CBI Manufacturing Council, to point out that the ONS data had absolutely nothing to do with the only aspect of manufacturing that matters for national prosperity, namely physical output. This note suggests that the ONS should put its house in order. We need not only facts, but a balanced presentation, without attention-seeking headlines.
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Abstract. The notion of de-industrialisation arises from the fact that industrial
employment, having risen rapidly, is now in equally rapid decline. This paper presents
the view that agriculture and industry together form, and have always formed, a
"primary" sector which from the beginning, because of its inherent capacity for
productivity gains, has progressively freed labour for non-productive work. The
"industrial" revolution was really a "primary sector" (in the above sense) revolution.
There is no new phenomenon of de-industrialisation, merely a speeding up of a process
of labour-freeing from the primary sector, whose ever decreasing work force produces ever increasing output.
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Abstract. Economic theory is dominated by abstract structures. Underneath, there is no firm foundation. Above, there is a lack of rigorous confrontation with established fact. Basic theoretical concepts have no acknowledged definition. The apparatus of graphs, algebra and technical vocabulary are often vehicles for rhetoric rather than descriptions of truth. In this abstract world, it seems to be accepted without embarrassment that all opinions are possible, while adopting the style of science in delivering each conclusion as if it was a fact. The closest parallel is perhaps with theology, where also each practitioner presents his story as fact, but there are differing stories. This paper illustrates this theme, with particular reference to "deindustrialization".
It points out that it is tangible things which are the primary measure, literally the sine
qua non, of all material, cultural and intellectual progress. Official statistics necessarily
aggregate market transactions involving tangibles and intangibles at monetary
exchange values. However it is an error, in the sense of being a misperception leading
to wrong action, to mistake this equivalencing of things and non-things as more than a
necessary procedural fiction. In this system, one opera performance equals, say, 100
lorryloads of gravel, but the logical reality is that gravel is part of the primary
inventory, opera and all other intangibles are secondary or consequential. This
inversion of the important and the estimable lies behind the paradox of the
deindustrialization which is in process and the deagriculturalization which has already
run its course in some parts of the world - namely that our entire civilisation rests (and
logically and factually must always rest) on the output of this (in employment terms)
disappearing sector. Eventually, the sector which ultimately produces all value
will appear in the statistics as one which adds zero value in current terms.
Fortunately, the real word of affairs shows no sign of acting on this erroneous
perception. For those accustomed to see the world in abstractions, misperceptions still
seem to obscure the reality.
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Abstract: Is industrial production relatively in decline? No, it is not. This note displays the evidence that for the last 40 years, in the 6 largest economies of the world, industrial production has kept pace with total output.
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WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL December 2002 Paper in pdf form
Abstract:     The author of this note takes it as self evident that prosperity and the provision of "things" (buildings, roads, furniture, furnishings, clothes, machines and equipment of all sorts) go together. The way people generally speak and act is in line with this view. If this is so, domestic manufacturing must continually keep pace with gross domestic product, provided that the necessary "things" are not imported from elsewhere. However, many people are persuaded that domestic manufacturing is in terminal decline, and that the lost output is being replaced by imports from the developing world. Almost daily, one may read of manufacturing jobs being "exported" to the Far East. However, it is simply impossible to import goods without a more or less balancing volume of exports, and there is in reality limited scope for exporting a sufficient volume of services. Imports of goods must more or less be balanced by the export of domestically produced goods. How can a widespread perception of decline be reconciled with a reality of growth? The answer is that the "decline" which is perceived is a decline in employment in the industrial sector, but this decline is more than counterbalanced by the rise of productivity, so that the domestic output of goods by and large keeps pace with the growth of GDP. This note summarises the statistical evidence for the accuracy of this view. A substantial footnote discusses the role of journalists and academics in sustaining the perception of the decline of manufacturing.
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Abstract. It seems rash even to raise the question in the title. The universal belief is
that the answer is and must be "yes". Yet factual evidence for this belief is curiously
lacking, maybe even felt to be unnecessary. This paper takes what is thought to be all
the, not very voluminous, post-war factual data which exists and which may bear on
the matter, and treats this data in every plausible way to find if any convincing
demonstration is possible that low inflation is associated with high long term growth
rate in GNP. This includes special attention to Germany, the country which is the
popular (and sole) paradigm among UK authorities and commentators. The paper
concludes that no such demonstration is possible.
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Abstract. In a previous paper, the author concluded that there was no evidence that
low inflation was associated with improved growth rate. In this note, he examines a
paper by R. J. Barro which tends to the opposing view. He suggests that the evidence
of this paper in fact reinforces his conclusion.
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Abstract. In a previous paper, the author concluded that there was no evidence that
low inflation was associated with improved growth rate. In a later note, he examined a
paper by R. J. Barro which tended to the opposing view, and suggested that the
evidence of that paper in fact reinforced his conclusion. In this note he comments on a
paper by W. R. J. Alexander, concluding that time series analysis, especially with
additional variables as in this paper, is unlikely to be able to contradict cross-section
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Abstract. The general view of the media, bankers, business and politicians, not noticeably contradicted by academics, is that one of the main functions, or the main function, of the central bank is to analyse the progress of the economy, and then to steer it with skilful judgement towards health and growth, by making decisions to change their base interest rate, with carefully chosen timing, amount and direction. The data presented here show that it is impossible to sustain this notion of skilful time-critical steering, or even that the central bank does in fact lead or determine the short term interest rates available to savers or business. The contrary proposition, that commercial short-term interest rates are in fact observed and followed by the central bank, is mathematically sustainable, and generally in accord with the observed facts.
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Abstract:     Following on from the note entitled “The Function of the Central Bank” (see above), this note brings the data up to date. It will be re-issued at intervals. It will monitor the tendency of short-term interest rates, give the author's judgement on the likely movement of the central bank rate in the UK, US and EU zones, and enable the reader to make his own judgement. An addendum shows that by the normal standards of statistical testing (which by their nature must always fall short of proof), the 3-month bank rate leads the changes announced by the central banks in their base rates.
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When Pigou vigorously attacked Keynes immediately the General Theory was published, he wrote that, “since a detailed running commentary would be both tedious and un-illuminating, I shall not adopt that method”. These reading notes follow precisely this tedious route. The truth cannot always be entertaining. Keynes was one of the most fluent and plausible rhetoricians of his age, and it could be argued that his work can be examined only by dismantling his rhetoric line by line to expose the total logical vacuum which in cold objective fact the General Theory is.
Keynes’ book was seemingly written at speed, contains no bibliography, virtually no mention of factual data, little evidence, pseudo-algebra only for appearances, no attempt at anything which could be called scientific method. His acknowledged greatness lay in his cleverness, and his great skill as a debater, negotiator, journalist, and politician, not at all in his ability or interest in searching out the truth. His “theory” is presented in terms of mechanistic cause-and-effect models of economic society, but quite demonstrably, these models are based on nothing but the repetitious re-statement of Keynes’s prior and evidence-free conviction that the cure for unemployment and recession is to stimulate spending, any spending, useful or useless, either by individuals or by governments. Keynes used every rhetorical trick imaginable to hide the empty centre of his work, from “as I shall show … ” onwards. His mainstay, as Pigou remarked, was a deliberate lack of precision and clarity. The great sociological mystery is - how did this transparently fact-free “theory” sweep everything before it?
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Abstract. It has been said, fairly plausibly, that "Bayesian inference is one of the most
widely known eponyms in all of science". But unlike common scientific eponyms, it is
by no means clear exactly what "Bayesian" means, and what it has to do with Bayes.
"Bayesian", and the dozen or so words and phrases which are usually associated with
it, seem to be more like unspecific words of the English language, deployed by an
author as he wishes, rather than fixed technical terms. The obscurity of the language,
relative to the precise meanings associated with, say, Newton's laws or Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle, is matched by the obscurity of the history - the virtually unknown
Bayes, the posthumous paper, the impenetrable and incoherent style, the muddled
logic, the virtual silence on his work for 200 years, the sudden emergence in the last
several decades, not of new knowledge, but of new Bayesian additions to the
vocabulary. This note surveys the notions and the history. It concludes that the
Bayesian vocabulary is vague and pretentious, and serves no useful purpose.
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Wittgenstein and Russell both in their different ways showed that they believed that ultimately, there were better things to do with one’s life than study or talk about philosophy. Both were remarkable men. The words of both appear in the English translation of the Tractatus, Russell’s in his introduction to Wittgenstein’s book. This note comments on these words, almost one at a time. The lack of clarity, logic and coherence of both authors raises the puzzling question – in what does greatness lie? Is it in personality, debating skill, membership of a mutually admiring elite? This note discovers nothing of interest or importance in anything actually written between the covers of this book. The note is essentially reading notes, as was my note on Keynes’ General Theory. I recall that when Keynes’ friend and rival, Pigou, vigorously attacked Keynes immediately the General Theory was published, he wrote that, “since a detailed running commentary would be both tedious and un-illuminating, I shall not adopt that method”. The notes below follow precisely this tedious route. The truth cannot always be entertaining. Pigou chose to challenge Keynes on the latter’s home ground, as a debater, a predictably hopeless task. For Wittgenstein, as for Keynes, I might argue that his work can be examined only by dismantling his rhetoric line by line to lay bare its lack of discipline, of coherence, of logical development, and of content.
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These are critical notes made while reading Deborah A Redmans's "Economics and the Philosophy of Science". The philosophy is largely that of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. Redman begins in the style of a neutral reporter, but later shows her impatience with the confusions sown by those eminent people. Hutchison supplies the main sceptical comments. My main comment is that neither Redman, nor the philosophers she quotes, appear to recognise that it is simply impossible to discuss "science" if the unstated assumption is that science is whatever anyone chooses to call science. One has to start with the strikingly observed worldwide unanimity of physicists and chemists within their respective disciplines, and take account of the fall-off of unanimity (that is, the widening scope for disagreement) as one moves through biology, medicine, etc. (that is, as the matters studied become more and more complex). Economists are in the absurd situation of claiming to be scientists, or at least, wanting to appear to be scientific, when the matters they study are simply too complex ever to lead to consensus. The absurdity is demonstrated when, for example, Friedman is cited in this book as claiming that there is no fundamental distinction between economics and the physical sciences. At the other end of the spectrum, historians and philosophers do well to ply their trade without making inappropriate claims of objectivity.
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This is my own translation of a work which appears from the bibliography to have a significant English-speaking audience, but of which there seems to be no readily accessible English version.
E O Wilson’s book "Consilience" is a notably unscientific plea for science to take over the so-called social sciences, from economics to psychology, and extend also into art and religion. The text rambles on, with exalted brilliance according to one reviewer, over this whole field, but the brilliance sheds no new light, and fails to explain exactly what consilience is, how it might be achieved, and what benefit would result if any of these subjects (for example, art) was connected back to genes, biology, chemistry and finally physics. It is not mentioned that such a connection to the "harder" sciences is in any case a pipedream.
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This counter is freely available from John and Ann Lockett's site at